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Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP80B01138A000100110001-1

NRO REVIEW  
COMPLETED

18 January 1965

Brief on Attached Paper on  
Overseas Processing and Reporting

Introduction

1. An Ad Hoc Committee on the above subject was established by agreement of the [ ] NRO, CIA, and DIA, the last included by a letter from General Carter of 27 November 1964, which appointed [ ] of CIA, [ ] of NPIC, and the undersigned (see Attachment A.).

2. The terms of reference of the Committee were established by [ ] of [ ] NRO (see Attachment B.).

3. The Committee proceeded by requesting [ ] of DIA, [ ] of Air Force to prepare initial drafts on general policies and procedures, NPIC responsibilities, and standards for processing, respectively.

4. Attached at Tab C is the draft statement prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee and reflects the discussion and tentative agreement. The next step before our meeting on Tuesday, 26 January is for the representatives now to exercise coordination within their agencies to see how acceptable is the policy and procedures statement attached.

5. It was recognized by the Ad Hoc Committee that the [ ] NRO does not have responsibility for reporting. However, since this had been agreed in the correspondence, since it was a part of the terms of reference, and furthermore, since the whole purpose of overseas processing is to secure prompt reporting, the Committee decided to take a cut at both the problems, i. e., processing and reporting.

6. The undersigned called the Committee's attention to General Carter's memorandum (Tab A), which requested that the results of these deliberations would be of great concern to the USIB and therefore at an appropriate point should receive the Board's consideration. The DIA member noted that the JCS would likewise be interested. The undersigned

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suggested that at the last meeting that it might be preferable for the Board to have a look at the proposal before it went to the JCS.

Background

7. Overseas processing installations were established or assigned to process U-2 photography as early as 1957, at which time there was an interagency agreement as to the designation of responsibilities. This agreement was reviewed by the Ad Hoc Committee. At that time the processing units were under Air Force cognizance. However, since then there have been extensive DoD reorganizations and the overseas processing units extant are now under the Unified and Specified Commands under direction of the JCS.

8. Also at the time of this agreement there had been a proposal that the readout function at these Recce Tech units should be under the supervision and direction of the CIA photo interpretation unit, the predecessor of NPIC. This, however, was not accepted. In lieu thereof it was agreed that CIA would have a deputy commander in the theater recce unit for PI when U-2 missions were involved. Also at that time the then DDCI, General Cabell, made clear to General Lewis, Chief of Air Force intelligence, that it was not the intention of CIA to establish theater Recce Tech units. Over the years NPIC's predecessor and subsequently the CIA unit in NPIC, by direction of the Director, NPIC has provided a fairly senior PI to serve as the deputy commander for readout. However, particularly after 1960 when there were spasmodic bursts of U-2 activity and with heavy work load at NPIC, it became increasingly difficult to afford shuttling a senior PI to the Far East, the area of principal activity.

9. Throughout this period there were continuing complaints from one quarter or another in the Agency, principally with regard to the quality of photo processing and occasionally of photo interpretation. 25X1A  
Whereas these complaints from the beginning centered on the [REDACTED]  
Recce Tech when the European theater was active, subsequently they centered on what has now become known as [REDACTED] 25X1A  
and a subordinate mobile unit in the [REDACTED] It should be noted that

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since 1958 the commander in charge of [REDACTED] has faced insurmountable bureaucratic problems in the procurement and maintenance of acceptable levels of equipment, materiel, personnel, and space, because his chain of command was through PACAF, CINCPAC, Air Force, and now to DIA. One commander, a Colonel [REDACTED], was particularly effective in surmounting these problems. However, when his tour was over, the absence of his energy plus the infrequency of U-2 missions allowed the [REDACTED] to go downhill. A Colonel [REDACTED] took over and OSA/CIA has been dissatisfied with [REDACTED] and on some occasions recently has used the [REDACTED] unit on [REDACTED] for original processing. During this period also there were frequent visits by a tech rep from [REDACTED] whose reports over the years both in regard to the unit at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] showed that there was much to be desired in terms of quality control, maintenance of equipment, etc. Although there have been complaints on quality of reporting, at least some of these may be traced to garbles in Commo (which is not the fault of reporting) and some due to the breakdown in procedures for H q t s. providing proper COMOR targeting and readout requirements.

10. It has now been over four years since use was made of the center at [REDACTED] has long been abandoned. The reasons are of course because there has been no U-2 activity in these areas. Meanwhile, over the last four years there has been extensive activity in the Far East. While there had been a so-called mobile unit placed at [REDACTED] to process the [REDACTED] remaining on standby for a period thereafter, it no longer exists. At the present time in the Far East processing and readout are handled as follows:

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### Need for Overseas Processing Centers

11. The Ad Hoc Committee at its very beginning examined the question of whether there is any need for developing the special centers and procedures therefore in view of the apparently shortened life of the U-2. The growth of air defense capabilities throughout the Far East and in the Middle East could mean that overflight of denied areas by the now less sophisticated reconnaissance vehicles is at an end.

12. In addition, since the beginning of the U-2 program, there have been great advances in the speed of both military and commercial aircraft so that it could be reasoned that the possibility of fast movement of film to the ZI after any collection vehicle has returned in either theater weakens the case for the development of overseas processing and readout centers.

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13. Although we have been expecting, momentarily for the above reasons, the termination of the use of U-2 overflight of denied areas for at least six years, it has continued. Meanwhile, [redacted]

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[redacted] has come into use. There may well be other reconnaissance vehicles which will emerge for which rapid processing and readout are required. The Ad Hoc Committee accordingly proceeded on the assumption that there is a need to strengthen the theater processing and readout and to rationalize the policies and procedures pertaining thereto.

Comment on the Attachment

14. The following picks out the key elements of discussion in the course of the preparation of Attachment C for the benefit of those who now appraise it:

a. Use of the Term 'National.' This term as applied to the processing units was given up and instead the phrase "In response to United States Intelligence Board requirements" is used. Such requirements under existing procedure are also reflective of the needs of theater commanders. In addition, at least in the case of the theater processing units, they will additionally and normally be engaged in processing of theater photography such as peripheral and ground photography.

b. Monitorship of Processing. The Committee was in agreement that unless there was a new element introduced (called for lack of a better word "technical monitorship" of processing) we would shortly return to the difficulties of the past. By "technical monitorship" is meant that the [redacted] NRO must have some technical means to assist the chain of command to establish authoritatively whether film washing was adequate, maintenance adequate, other quality controls being exercised, etc. Whereas there was agreement on the need for

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
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this, we found no effective language to introduce this point except as indicated in para 5a(4), i. e., "Provide OPC s technological assistance in the field on photographic processing."

c. Responsibilities of NPIC. The group considered a possible interpretation of NSCID-8 to the effect that NPIC is responsible for the initial readout in the theater. It was concluded that such an interpretation was not intended when the NSCID was approved. This of course would not foreclose on a new agreement to that effect. However, it was felt that it would not be satisfactory in the military structure to presume to have the military PI in place move over and then turn the PI over to a headquarters unit for certain missions. There would further, under such a thesis, be tremendous costs involved in maintaining a headquarters unit on a regular basis or transporting such a team for a particular mission. The upshot of the discussion was that the best way would be to send NPIC individuals on request of either the theater commander or other authority and meanwhile to provide in addition the reference materials listed in the paragraph (5c of Attachment C) dealing with NPIC responsibilities.

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Special Assistant (COMOR)

Deputy Director

for


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Attachments:

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

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
National Reconnaissance Office

SUBJECT: Review of Overseas Photographic  
Handling, Processing, and Reporting  
of Sensitive Photography

1. We have your cable of 20 November 1964 proposing an ad hoc committee to review and update policies and procedures for overseas handling, processing, and reporting of sensitive reconnaissance photography. This is a desirable first step in clearing up a somewhat confused picture. We agree with [redacted] proposal of 9 November 1964 that the "sensitive" photographic missions should include the [redacted] drone missions. We would also expect that SAC U-2 operations in Indochina would be treated as well.

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2. It is necessary to make a change in the CIA membership I proposed in my letter of 8 June to [redacted] It will be as follows: 25X1

[redacted]  
(NPIC)

They have been informed and await the call of the Chairman.

3. Any change in policy or procedures which may be recommended by this group and approved by you should of course be forwarded to USIB for final decision, since this is a matter of primary concern to the intelligence community.

/s/  
Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

cc: Director, DIA

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Attachment B

7 December 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL OHLMEYER, AFSPPL

SUBJECT: Establishment of Ad Hoc Committee

At the request of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and at the direction of the Director, [ ] National Reconnaissance Office, an Ad Hoc Committee is hereby established to:

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1. Review and update policies and procedures for overseas handling, processing, and reporting of sensitive photographic reconnaissance missions.
2. Review and redefine (as necessary) operational, logistic, and technological responsibilities and support sources for overseas URPICs to conform with the present organizational structure within the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program.
3. Analyze and define technological and production capability criteria and standards required of URPICs requisite to their employment in support of sensitive photographic missions.
4. Evaluate existing URPICs presently or potentially employable in the support of sensitive photographic missions against the above established criteria.
5. Recommend reasonable actions which should be taken to:
  - a. Upgrade existing facilities where necessary.
  - b. Delete facilities where need no longer exists.
  - c. Add new or additional facilities where need exists.

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Attachment B

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Written reports shall be submitted to the [ ] NRO on or before the dates indicated as follows:

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1. Phase I, consisting of Tasks 1 and 2 above--20 January 1965.
2. Phase II, consisting of Tasks 3, 4, and 5 above--1 February 1965.

Membership of the Committee shall consist of:

Colonel Harold Z. Ohlmeyer, AFSPPL, Chairman

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[ ] Staff, Member

[ ] DIA, Member

[ ] C, Member

[ ] member

[ ] (Member), Member

[ ] Lt. Col. John G. Paynter, Hdq USAF, Member

You are authorized to appoint from within your organization one officer to serve as Executive Secretary to the Committee.

It is desired that meetings of the full Committee be held in the Washington, D. C. area to commence not later than 8 December 1964.

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/S/

[ ] Brig General, USAF

Director, [ ] NRO Staff

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Attachment C

SUBJECT: Policy and Procedures for Overseas handling, Processing and Reporting on Photographic Reconnaissance Missions Over Denied Areas (Excluding Satellite Reconnaissance)

1. PURPOSE: To establish policies and procedures for the overseas handling, processing and reporting on photographic reconnaissance missions over denied areas in response to United States Intelligence Board (USIB) requirements.
2. CANCELLATION: Upon implementation of these policies and procedures all prior agreements governing operations covered by the subject of this document, are null and void.
3. GENERAL: In order to provide for the most expeditious processing and reporting of nationally programmed photographic reconnaissance missions, two (2) fixed photographic processing and reporting facilities one (1) in the European Theatre and one (1) in the Pacific Theatre have been designated. Mobile processing and reporting units will be established as required.  
  
These centers will be responsible, primarily, for processing to meet (S) National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) standards and expeditious reporting in response to requirements of the USIB and, additionally, requirements of the respective parent Unified Command.
4. FACILITIES: In order to provide the required facilities and personnel, the Department of Defense (DOD) has designated as Overseas Processing and Interpretation Centers (OPIC), the following:

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


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- e. Such other facilities as may, on an interim basis, be required by the [redacted] National Reconnaissance Office to support the [redacted] National Reconnaissance Program.

5. MISSION: It shall be the mission of the Overseas Processing and Interpretation Centers to process, reproduce and report on such reconnaissance missions as may be directed to their attention by the [redacted] NRO. 25X1  
In fulfilling this mission requirement the following tasks will be accomplished.

a. [redacted] National Reconnaissance Office (NRO):

- (1) Assign processing and reporting responsibilities to specific OPIC's.
- (2) Provide designated OPIC, the responsible Unified and Specified Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency, (CIA), National Photographic Interpretation Center, (NPIC), timely mission alerting information as required.
- (3) Provide mission track to the designated OPIC as soon as practicable.
- (4) Provide OPIC's technological assistance in the field of photographic processing.
- (5) Provide OPIC's with emergency procurement and shipment of photographic processing equipment and supplies.
- (6) Provide emergency funding to support OPIC operations.
- (7) Provide basic guidance on National plans (e.g., anticipated sortie rates, emergence of new capabilities, etc.,) which will affect the accomplishment of OPIC missions.

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b. Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR):

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- (1) Provide guidance to the [ ] NRO as to the degree of urgency on processing and reporting of each mission.
- (2) Provide each OPIC the required Automatic Data Processing support concerning COMOR established reconnaissance objectives.

c. (C) National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC):

- (1) Provide each OPIC support concerning background data on COMOR reconnaissance objectives.
- (2) Provide each OPIC with support to enhance the maintenance of an intelligence library.
- (3) Provide each OPIC, on request, photographic interpretation assistance for the reporting of COMOR reconnaissance objectives.

d. Department of Defense:

(1) Unified and Specified Commands:

- (a) Insure adequate facilities, personnel, equipment, and supplies for processing are provided the OPIC's in accordance with the standards established by the [ ] NRO.

- (b) Insure adequate facilities, personnel, equipment and supplies for photographic exploitation are provided the OPICs in accordance with standards established by the Department of Defense (DOD).

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- (c) Insure implementation of instructions and tasks as established by the [ ] NRO.

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- (2) Defense Intelligence Agency: Act as the agent for [ ] NRO, COMOR, and NPIC as the point of contact between the intelligence community and the OPIC's.

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(3) The Military Departments:

(a) Provide personnel, facilities and equipment as required to support the [ ] NRP.

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(b) Provide and maintain secure communications.

(4) Overseas Processing and Interpretation Centers (OPIC):

(a) Maintain required security of their designated operating areas.

(b) Procure, and maintain their processing equipment and supplies in accordance with the standards established by [ ] NRO.

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(c) Acquire, and maintain on board, adequately cleared and appropriately qualified personnel required for sustained operations.

(d) Acquire and maintain an intelligence reference library to enhance the timeliness and accuracy of reporting.

(e) Process original negatives of assigned mission.

(f) Reproduce and ship copies as requested.

(g) Prepare and transmit the Theater Commander's Immediate Photo Interpretation Report (IPIR).

6. FUNDING:

a. Overseas Processing and Interpretation Centers operated by the U.S. Air Force will be funded through Air Force channels. USAF in conjunction with [ ] NRO will insure that sufficient funds are budgeted annually to cover the anticipated cost of National Program support. As in the past, extraordinary costs, beyond that for which funds have been budgeted, and emergency procurement support, will continue to be furnished by the [ ] NRO.

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b. Overseas Processing and Interpretation Centers operated by the   NRO  
U.S. Navy will be provided direct material support by the   25X1  
NRO on an, as required, basis.

7. COMMUNICATIONS: All communications bearing on nationally controlled operations will be handled via SSO channels, except in those cases where specific authorization has been received from the   NRO. 25X1  
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Access to this document will be restricted to those persons  
cleared for the specific projects;

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